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JUSTICE DELAYED IS ... DELAY IGNORED:
THE INDIFFERENCE OF JUDGES AND LAW
PROFESSORS TO LEGAL LASSITUDE
Jeffrey O'Connell* & Craig A. Stanton**
It has long been recognized that one of the greatest weaknesses in
traditional tort compensation stems from the length of delays involved
in the typical litigation process. Parties must commonly face a delay
of years before they can even get to court, forcing needy, seriously
injured, and especially low-income claimants to settle for much less
than the expected value of their claim.' This, however, could be just
the beginning. If a claim reaches the appellate level, parties involved
could well face delay of up to ten years before any decision is ulti-
mately granted. Even worse, that ultimate decision may well be an
order for a new trial.
Such huge delays, in fact, are not at all uncommon. Tracing the
length of time between incident and appellate opinion, a delay of over
six years is typical. To illustrate this simple truth, one need not per-
form any costly or sophisticated research. Any popular tort casebook
will do. We have largely focused on four such casebooks, written by
Daniel Dobbs and Paul Hayden, 2 Richard Epstein,3 Marc Franklin
and Robert Rabin,4 and James Henderson Jr., Richard Pearson and
* The Samuel H. McCoy, II Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.A. 1951, Dartmouth
College; J.D. 1954, Harvard University.
** B.A. 1993, New York University; M.A. 1995, University of Virginia; J.D./Ph.D. 1999, Uni-
versity of Virginia.
1. See the American Law Institute's massive review of personal injury tort law. "Perhaps the
main weaknesses in tort compensation stem from the time lag involved .... The prospect of
years-long delays before the parties can get to court forces the most seriously injured victims to
settle out of court for much less than the expected value of the claim." Enterprise Responsibility
for Personal Injury, 1 A.L.I. 263, 265 (1991) [hereinafter ALl]. "As to the timeliness of compen-
sation, U.S. and Canadian studies disclose considerable delays in the payment of third-party
benefits, particularly to claimants with serious injuries involving higher pecuniary losses and a
greater likelihood of litigation and attorney involvement." Id. at 367 (citing Report on Motor
Vehicle Accident Compensation, 1973 ONTARIO L. REFORM COMMISSION 56-63).
2. DANIEL B. DOBBS & PAUL HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTA-
BILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY (1997).
3. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS IN TORTS (1995).
4. MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND
MATERIALS (1996).
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John Siliciano.5 Within this universe, a striking number of cases exist
where the delay is between six and ten years, and in certain instances
between ten and thirteen years.6
In order to allow for possible historical differences (such as changes
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), which could have affected
the amount of time involved in the payment of claims, we have limited
ourselves to cases since 1950. Areas such as emotional harm, where
the law varies drastically from state to state, and where it has been
exceptionally vague are not included. In addition, certain product lia-
bility/chemical exposure cases, and nuisance cases where no cause in
fact can be traced back to a specific date, have also been eliminated.
Below is a sample of our findings, sorted by appellate opinion dates.
Within the parameters indicated, we have included every case that we
could find with a period of four or more years between incident and
appellate opinion. The key point is that we have found no instance
when either the original opinion or the casebook editors found the
delay worth mentioning, no matter how lengthy.
The table below contains seven categories. Column one accounts
for the name of the case. Column two indicates the incident date, or
the date on which the accident occurred. Column three indicates the
date on which the appellate opinion was finalized. Column four indi-
cates the number of years between the incident date and the appellate
opinion. Column five indicates the final disposition of the case at the
time the appellate opinion was finalized (i.e., whether a new trial was
ordered, whether the lower level opinion was affirmed, if the case was
dismissed, etc.). Column six indicates the type of case involved. Fi-
nally, the last column indicates casebooks from which the cases were
taken. We have divided the cases into four main categories defined as
follows:
(1) PRODUCT LIABILITY - cases specifically involving a negligently
produced or otherwise defective product, where the claimant is an in-
jured consumer.
(2) MEDICAL MALPRACTICE - negligence cases specifically stemming
from the health care provider/patient relationship.
(3) PRIVATE INTENTIONAL TORT - non-product or medical malprac-
tice assault cases.
(4) OTHER - all other non-product or medical malpractice tort cases.
Our universe of cases is drastically limited by the fact that incident
dates are routinely left out of opinions. Less than half of the opinions
5. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS (1994).
6. See tables contained in subsequent pages of text.
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in any given casebook actually list incident dates, an omission which
itself speaks volumes about how seriously delays are taken.7 There-
fore, this study is drawn only from those cases for which dates could
be found, either in federal reporters, state reporters, or casebooks. To
reemphasize the point, in none of the following cases did the
court-nor the casebook editors-even deign to notice, or provide any
information regarding the length of delay.8
NAME OF CASE INCIDENT APPELLATE DELAY FINAL TYPE CASEBOOK
DATE OPINION IN DISPOSITION OF
DATE YEARS CASE
Carter v. Kinney
Talbott v. C.R.
Bard, Inc.
Harper v.
Herman
Pavia v. State
Farm Insurance
Co.
Shanks v. The
Upjohn Co.
Ramirez v.
Plough
Anderson v.
Service
Merchandise
Jones v.
O'Young
Vergara v. Doan
Smith v.
Richmond
Memorial
Hospital
United Blood
Service v.
Quintana
2/3/90
1988
8/9/86
4/85
8/29/84
3/86
6/27/86
4/85
5/31/79
7/88
5/27/83
1995
1995
5 Affirmed Other
7 Dismissed Prod.
Liab.
7 Reversed Other
Franklin
Franklin
Franklin
8 Dismissed Other Franklin
8 New Trial Prod.
Liab.
6 New Trial Prod.
Liab.
6 Remanded Prod.
Liab.
7 Remanded Med.
Mal.
13 Reversed Med.
Mal.
4 Remanded Med.
Mal.
Dobbs;
Epstein
Franklin
Franklin
Franklin
Henderson;
Dobbs
Dobbs
9 New Trial Prod. Henderson;
Liab. Dobbs;
Epstein
7. At first, we suspected that casebook editors had been eliminating incident dates from the
summary of the facts. However, after attempting to trace the history of several dozen cases, we
have concluded that state and federal reporters also almost uniformly fail to notice, or focus in
any way, on the often huge delays involved.
8. Casebooks also routinely fail to recognize delays as an issue of any importance. For exam-
ple, trial delay does not appear in the index of any of the four casebooks used in this study. In
fact, those casebooks which mention delay anywhere in the text typically dedicate no more than
one line to the issue. The following excerpt is a common example: "In general, the system stands
accused of overcompensating the slightly injured, undercompensating the seriously injured, de-
laying the payment of claims .... " HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 794. The only exception
among the casebooks used in this study is the Dobbs & Hayden text, which dedicates four short
paragraphs to the problem of delay in a chapter of 20 pages entitled Evaluating Tort Law.
DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 2, at 824.
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NAME OF CASE
Hines v. Denver
& Rio Grande
Western
Railroad Co.
Wegner v.
Milwaukee
Mutual
Insurance Co.
Sokolowski v.
MediMart
Khan v. Shiley
Inc.
Indiana
Harbour Belt
Railroad v.
American
Cyanamid Co.
Ward v. K-Mart
Corp.
McDougald v.
Garber
Berkovitz v.
United States
Camacho v.
Honda Motor
Co.
Polmatier v.
Russ
Boyle v. United
Technologies
Corp.
Corva v. United
Services
Automobile
Ass'n
Delaney v. The
Empire
Insurance Co.
Strauss v. Belle
Realty Co.
Burnett v.
National
Enquirer
Hardy v.
LaBelle's
District Co.
Trimarco v.
Klein
INCIDENT APPELLATE DELAY FINAL TYPE CASEBOOK
DATE OPINION IN DISPOSITION OF
DATE YEARS CASE
9/85 1992 7 Remanded Other Henderson
8/27/86
12/30/85 1991
7/29/83
1/2/79
10/11/85 1990
9nn8
5/10/9
3/78
11/20/76 1988
4/27/83
3/29/79
6/11/80
7/13/77
3/27/76
12/78
1976
5 Remanded Other Dobbs
6 Affirmed Other Dobbs
7 New Trial Prod. Henderson
Liab.
11 Remanded Other Henderson;
Dobbs;
Epstein;
Franklin
5 Affirmed Other Henderson;
Dobbs;
Epstein
11 New Trial Med. Henderson;
Mal. Dobbs;
Epstein;
Franklin
9 Remanded Prod. Epstein;
Liab. Franklin
10 Remanded Prod. Dobbs;
Liab. Henderson
12 Affirmed Priv. Dobbs;
Intent. Epstein
5 Remanded Prod. Dobbs;
Liab. Epstein;
Franklin
6 Affirmed Other Henderson
5 Affirmed Other Henderson
8 Remanded Other Dobbs;
Epstein;
Franklin
7 Affirmed Other Epstein;
Franklin
5 Affirmed Other Dobbs
6 New Trial Other Henderson;
Epstein;
Franklin
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NAME OF CASE INCIDENT APPELLATE DELAY FINAL TYPE CASEBOOK
DATE OPINION IN DISPOSITION OF
Dickens v.
Puryear
LaBrier v.
Anheuser Ford,
Inc.
Wendland v.
Ridgefield
Construction
Services, Inc.
Gleason v.
Guzman
Bernier v.
Boston Edison
Co.
Lode v.
Mercanio
Smith v.
Knowles
Berman v. Allan
Daly v. General
Motors Corp.
Zuther v. Schild
Safeway Stores,
Inc. v. Nest-
Kart
Becker v.
Interstate
Properties
Farwell v.
Keaton
Tarasoff v.
Regents of
University of
California
Altieri v.
Colasso
Katko v. Briney
Womack v.
Eldridge
Steinhauser v.
Hertz Corp.
Brune v.
Belinkoff
Coyne v.
Campbell
Seffert v. L.A.
Transit Lines
DATE
4/2/75 1981
4/17/75
10/30/73 1981
9/29/70
5/24/72
4/11/73
2/13/74
11/3/74
10/31/70 1978
2/7/73
1/71
8/31/72
8/26/66
10/27/69 1976
4/2/66
6/16/67
5/27/70
9/4/64
10/58
7/5/57
10/11/57
YEARS CASE
6 Rev/Aff'd Other Dobbs
in part
6 New Trial Other Dobbs
8 Remanded Other Dobbs
11 Affirmed Other Dobbs
8 Affirmed Other Dobbs
6 Affirmed Other Dobbs
5 Affirmed Med. Dobbs
Mal.
5 Remanded Med. Henderson;
Mal. Dobbs
8 Reversed Prod. Dobbs;
Liab. Franklin
5 Affirmed Other Dobbs
6 Affirmed Prod. Dobbs;
Liab. Epstein;
Franklin
5 Reversed Other Henderson;
Dobbs
10 Reversed Other Henderson;
Dobbs;
Franklin
7 Affirmed Med. Henderson;
Mal. Dobbs;
Epstein;
Franklin
9 Remanded Priv. Dobbs
Intent.
4 Affirmed Priv. Henderson;
Intent. Dobbs;
Epstein;
Franklin
4 Reversed Priv. Franklin
Intent.
6 New Trial Other Epstein;
Franklin
10 New Trial Med. Henderson;
Mal. Epstein
5 Affirmed Other Henderson;
Epstein
4 Affirmed Other Franklin
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NAME OF CASE INCIDENT APPELLATE DELAY FINAL TYPE CASEBOOK
DATE OPINION IN DISPOSITION OF
DATE YEARS CASE
Brown v. 9/54 1961 7 Remanded Other Dobbs
Martinez
Garratt v. 7/16/51 1955 4 Reversed Priv. Henderson;
Dailey Intent. Dobbs;
Epstein;
Franklin
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS
For these fifty-one cases, collected from four popular casebooks, the
average length of time between incident and appellate opinion is 6.94
years, with almost half (twenty-three) involving remands or new trials
ordered by appellate judges. Only eighteen out of fifty-one cases
were approved at the appellate level. There were eight reversals, and
two dismissals.
ALTERNATIVES
While it is difficult to leap from the specific findings of this limited
study to broader general conclusions about the tort system, these find-
ings still offer general insight into the problem of claim payment de-
lays. Even based only on the findings of this very brief, rudimentary
study, the need for attention to the problem of payment delays seems
obvious. The current fault based tort mechanism is often profoundly
deficient with regard to handling claims quickly (especially in cases
involving product liability and medical malpractice claims). How can
severely injured claimants, often facing serious uncompensated medi-
cal and wage losses (or worse), be expected to hold out for 6.94 years
(the average delay from this cross-section of cases) before receiving
compensation, not to speak of the emotional drain such delays pro-
long?9 But still more telling is the indifference of judges and law
professors to the plight of those facing such delays, even when such
9. "[I]njured persons, with mounting medical expenses and wage losses, are often pressured
into settling their cases with a tremendous discount against the delay that a jury trial would
entail .... " JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE BLAME GAME 126 (1987). See also PAUL C. WEILER,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 52 (1991).
According to the General Accounting Office (GAO) survey of malpractice claims
closed in 1984, the median time from medical injury to tort claim was thirteen months,
and the time from claim to payment was another twenty-three months, or a total of
three years before the typical patient received any financial redress for an injury. Such
a delay is a serious drawback in any compensation scheme. The personal trauma of
having to deal with a major disabling injury cannot be alleviated simply by receiving a
benefit check in the mail years after the injured party and family had to adjust to the
disaster.
1999] JUSTICE DELAYED IS... DELAY IGNORED 495
delays stare them in the face. Courts might try to justify this failure to
acknowledge such delays in that at least the case being litigated will
clarify the law, supposedly leading to more prompt settlement of fu-
ture cases. But this excuse overlooks the huge delays that prevail in
settled as well as litigated cases (about sixteen months even in the
routine auto accident case), and the individual hardship in the case
before the court.10 Some concern about the law's delay for parties
involved ought to be occasionally referenced, if such concern exists.
Based on the foregoing, what if anything can be expected from judges
or law professors (and presumably their students when later practicing
law) on their own initiatives regarding such delays?"
10. See ALl, supra note 1, at 12.
11. The senior author has suggested making changes in the existing tort system, such as early
offers, contingency fee reforms, and auto choice insurance options in an effort to deal with,
among other things, the problem of delays in personal injury cases. For proposals substituting
prompt payment for economic loss in place of dilatory, full-scale claims in auto personal injury
cases, see Auto Choice Reform Act of 1997, S. 625, 105th Cong. (1997); Jeffrey O'Connell et al.,
The Comparative Costs of Allowing Consumer Choice For Auto Insurance In All Fifty States, 55
MD. L. REv. 160 (1996); see also JOINT ECONOMIC COMMrIEE STUDY, 105th CONG., 2D SESS.,
AUTO CHOICE: RELIEF FOR BUSYNESS & CONSUMERS (July 1998). For reform of contingency
fees with an eye toward encouraging more timely payment, see LESIER BRICKMAN ET AL., RE-
THINKING CONTINGENCY FEES (1994); Lester Brickman et al., The Contingency Fee Proposal,
With Section-By-Section Commentary, 44 EMORY L.J. 194 app. (1995); Michael Horowitz, Mak-
ing Ethics Real, Making Ethics Work: A Proposal for Contingency Fee Reform, 44 EMORY L.J.
173 (1995). The contingency fee is proposed for action by either statute or court rule. Perhaps
thus prodded, some judges might be prompted to act. For a bill, see S. 1861, 104th Cong. § 201
(1996). For another reform proposal, encouraging prompt payment restricted to economic losses
for all types of personal injury claims, see S. 1861, 104th Cong. § 101 (1996); Jeffery O'Connell,
Two-Tier Tort Law: Neo No-Fault & Quasi-Criminal Liability, 27 WAKE FOREST L. Rav. 871,
883-92 (1992).
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